A new report from Kaspersky ICS CERT, published December 24, 2025, details a concerning rise in threats to industrial automation systems in East Asia during the third quarter of 2025. The percentage of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) computers in the region that encountered malicious objects rose from 19.7% to 25.0%, moving East Asia from seventh to third in global rankings. The primary driver of this increase was a sharp spike in malicious scripts and phishing pages, a threat category that was blocked on East Asian ICS computers at a rate 1.4 times the worldwide average. Much of this activity was concentrated in Mainland China's engineering and ICS integrator sector.
The Kaspersky report highlights a shift in the threat landscape for East Asian ICS environments. While threats from removable media and network shares are on a long-term decline, attacks delivered via the internet are surging.
The attack vector relies on tricking users into executing malicious code on workstations that have access to, or are part of, the industrial network.
T1204.002 - User Execution: Malicious File: Users are lured into downloading and running what they believe to be legitimate software (e.g., a Torrent client), which contains a hidden malicious payload.T1059.007 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript: The surge in malicious scripts indicates attackers are heavily using web-based scripts (JavaScript, VBScript) to perform reconnaissance, download further payloads, or steal information directly from the browser.T1566 - Phishing: Phishing remains a primary initial access vector to deliver these malicious scripts and links to trojanized software.The compromise of ICS environments can have severe consequences, ranging from production downtime to physical safety incidents.
Detecting these threats in an ICS environment requires monitoring both IT and OT networks.
Protecting ICS environments requires a defense-in-depth strategy.
M1033 - Limit Software Installation: Implement strict application allowlisting on all ICS assets, including engineering workstations. This would prevent unauthorized software like the trojanized Torrent clients from ever running.M1030 - Network Segmentation: Enforce rigid segmentation between the IT and OT networks. Internet access from the control network should be heavily restricted or prohibited entirely. Engineers should not be able to browse the web or check personal email from a workstation used to program PLCs.M1017 - User Training: Provide targeted security awareness training for all personnel with access to the ICS network. This training should cover the risks of phishing and downloading unauthorized software.Implement application allowlisting to prevent any unauthorized software, such as the trojanized P2P clients mentioned in the report, from being executed on sensitive ICS workstations.
Strictly segment the OT network from the corporate IT network and the internet to prevent web-based threats from reaching critical control systems.
Train engineers and operators on the risks of phishing and the importance of not installing personal or unauthorized software on company assets, especially those with access to the OT environment.
The most effective technical control to prevent threats like those described in the Kaspersky report is Executable Allowlisting. In sensitive ICS environments, the set of required software is typically static and well-defined. Security teams should create a 'golden image' for engineering workstations and HMIs that includes only approved and necessary applications. An allowlisting policy should then be strictly enforced, preventing any other executable, script, or installer from running. This would have directly prevented the trojanized Torrent and MediaGet clients from executing, regardless of how the user was tricked into downloading them. Implementing this requires a thorough inventory of required software and a robust change management process for updates, but it provides an extremely strong defense against malware execution.
To counter the rise of internet-borne threats to ICS, strong Network Isolation based on the Purdue Model is essential. The process control network (Levels 0-2) should be completely air-gapped from the internet or, at a minimum, strictly segregated from the corporate IT network via a properly configured DMZ. All traffic between the IT and OT networks must be explicitly permitted and inspected by a firewall. Direct internet access from any host within the OT network should be prohibited. For engineers who need to access external resources, a secure jump host or VDI solution within the IT network should be used, with data transfer to the OT side being a controlled and monitored process. This isolation breaks the attack chain described by Kaspersky, as it prevents engineers on OT workstations from browsing malicious websites or receiving phishing emails that could deliver malicious scripts.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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