Over 219,000 (based on filings in TX, SC, ME)
Kaplan North America, LLC, a major provider of educational services, has completed its investigation into a significant data breach that occurred in late 2025. The company confirmed on February 21, 2026, that an unauthorized actor had accessed its servers and exfiltrated files containing sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (PII). The stolen data includes names, Social Security numbers (SSNs), and driver's license numbers. While the full number of victims is not yet public, state-level disclosures indicate a massive scale, with over 200,000 individuals confirmed affected in just three states (Texas, South Carolina, and Maine). The company is now in the process of notifying victims and is facing potential class-action lawsuits.
The security incident occurred over a three-week period, from October 30, 2025, to November 18, 2025. During this window, an unauthorized third party gained access to Kaplan's computer servers. The initial access vector has not been disclosed. The attackers were able to navigate the network and exfiltrate specific files containing highly sensitive PII of what are likely current and former students or employees.
The compromised data includes a toxic combination of information highly sought after for identity theft:
Kaplan engaged external IT security specialists to secure its network and investigate the scope of the breach. The investigation concluded on February 21, 2026, and the company began sending notification letters to victims on March 17, 2026, offering one year of complimentary identity protection services through Experian.
This incident appears to be a classic 'smash and grab' data theft operation. The likely TTPs involved would be:
T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application) or a successful phishing campaign against an employee (T1566 - Phishing).T1083 - File and Directory Discovery). They likely looked for files with names indicating student records or HR information.T1074 - Data Staged).T1048 - Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol). The extended three-week dwell time gave the attacker ample opportunity to locate and steal data.The lengthy dwell time suggests potential gaps in detection capabilities. Organizations should focus on:
Encrypt files containing sensitive PII at rest to make them unreadable even if they are stolen.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Apply the principle of least privilege to file shares, ensuring only authorized personnel can access folders containing SSNs and other PII.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
To detect and prevent a large-scale data theft like the one at Kaplan, implementing User Data Transfer Analysis through a Data Loss Prevention (DLP) solution is critical. A network and endpoint DLP system should be configured with policies to identify sensitive data patterns, such as Social Security numbers and driver's license numbers. The system would then monitor for this data in motion. For example, if an attacker tries to exfiltrate a large file containing thousands of SSNs over an outbound channel like HTTPS or FTP, the DLP system would detect the pattern, block the transfer, and generate a high-priority alert for the security team. This acts as a last line of defense, preventing the data from leaving the network even if the attacker has already gained access to the file server.
A foundational preventative control for Kaplan is the rigorous application of Local File Permissions based on the principle of least privilege. Sensitive data, especially files containing SSNs, should not be stored in broadly accessible network shares. This data should be moved to a secure, access-controlled repository or file server. Access Control Lists (ACLs) on these files and directories must be configured to allow access only to a small, explicitly defined group of users (e.g., specific HR or finance personnel) who have a legitimate business need. All other access, including from general user accounts and service accounts, should be denied. Regularly auditing these permissions ensures that 'privilege creep' does not occur. This simple but effective measure dramatically reduces the attack surface, as a compromise of a standard employee account would not grant access to the organization's most sensitive data.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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