Ivanti has disclosed two critical vulnerabilities, CVE-2026-1281 and CVE-2026-1340, in its Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) product, formerly known as MobileIron Core. Both vulnerabilities have a CVSS score of 9.8, reflecting their extreme severity. Crucially, Ivanti and Singapore's Cyber Security Agency (CSA) have confirmed that these flaws are being actively exploited in the wild as zero-day attacks. Successful exploitation allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the EPMM appliance. This provides a direct pathway to compromise the central management point for an organization's mobile devices, potentially exposing vast amounts of sensitive corporate and personal data. Organizations using affected versions of EPMM are strongly advised to apply the provided patches immediately.
The technical specifics of the vulnerabilities have not been fully disclosed by Ivanti to prevent wider exploitation. However, their nature as unauthenticated RCE flaws means an attacker does not need any credentials or prior access to the target system. They can be exploited over the network, likely by sending a specially crafted request to an exposed API endpoint on the EPMM server. This type of vulnerability is highly sought after by threat actors as it provides a direct and often easy path to initial access.
The vulnerabilities impact the following versions of Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM):
12.5.0.x12.6.0.x12.7.0.x12.5.1.0 (Specific build)12.6.1.0 (Specific build)Organizations running any of these versions on their appliances are considered vulnerable and should take immediate action.
Both vulnerabilities are confirmed to be under active exploitation in the wild. This has been corroborated by both Ivanti and the Cyber Security Agency of Singapore. The designation of these flaws as zero-days indicates that attackers were exploiting them before patches were available. This elevates the urgency for patching to the highest level, as active, weaponized exploits are already in circulation. The exploitation likely falls under T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application.
The impact of exploiting these vulnerabilities is severe. An EPMM server is a highly privileged asset within an organization's infrastructure, as it manages, secures, and inventories the entire fleet of mobile devices (smartphones and tablets).
root or SYSTEM user.While specific IOCs are not public, defenders should hunt for signs of exploitation on their EPMM appliances:
| Type | Value | Description |
|---|---|---|
log_source |
EPMM / MobileIron Core web server logs |
Monitor for unusual or malformed requests to web application endpoints, especially from unknown IP addresses. |
process_name |
(Anomalous processes) |
Look for unexpected processes spawning from the main EPMM web service process (e.g., bash, sh, powershell.exe, cmd.exe). |
network_traffic_pattern |
Outbound connections from EPMM |
EPMM appliances should generally not initiate outbound connections to arbitrary internet hosts. Monitor for any such connections, especially over common C2 channels (e.g., ports 443, 80, 53 to non-standard servers). |
file_path |
/tmp/, /var/tmp/ |
Monitor for newly created executable files or web shells in temporary directories on the appliance. |
Given the active exploitation, rapid detection is critical.
4xx or 5xx error codes that could indicate failed exploit attempts, or 200 OK responses for unexpected endpoints. Look for requests from untrusted IP addresses.If a compromise is suspected, isolate the appliance from the network immediately and initiate incident response procedures.
Immediate patching is the only effective remediation.
Important: Ivanti has noted that these are temporary hotfixes. They must be reapplied if the appliance is upgraded to a new minor version before the permanent fix is released.
12.8.0.0 as soon as it is released, as this will contain the permanent fix for these vulnerabilities.The primary mitigation is to apply the security patches provided by Ivanti immediately to prevent exploitation.
Restrict network access to the EPMM management interface to only trusted internal IP ranges, reducing the attack surface available to external threats.
Implement strict egress filtering to block unexpected outbound connections from the EPMM appliance, which can prevent C2 communication after a successful compromise.
The immediate and most critical action is to apply the RPM script patches provided by Ivanti. Given that these are actively exploited zero-day vulnerabilities, the patching process should be treated as an emergency change. Organizations must bypass standard, lengthy testing cycles and deploy the fix to all internet-facing EPMM appliances immediately, followed by internal ones. It is crucial to identify all affected instances of EPMM, including those in development or staging environments, as they can also serve as entry points. A robust asset inventory is a prerequisite for this. After patching, teams must verify successful application by checking the installed RPM versions. Furthermore, a plan must be established to deploy the permanent fix in EPMM version 12.8.0.0 as soon as it becomes available, as the current patches are temporary hotfixes.
As a critical compensating control, organizations must implement strict inbound traffic filtering for their EPMM appliances. The management interfaces for these systems should never be exposed directly to the public internet. Access should be restricted at the network edge (perimeter firewall or cloud security group) to a tightly controlled allowlist of IP addresses. This list should only include corporate VPN gateways and trusted internal administrative subnets. This action dramatically reduces the attack surface, making it impossible for a remote, unauthenticated attacker to reach the vulnerable endpoints. If business requirements necessitate broader access, consider placing the service behind a Web Application Firewall (WAF) with a specific ruleset designed to inspect and block malicious requests targeting Ivanti products, although this is a secondary defense compared to network-level access restriction.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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