Almaviva, a major Italian information technology provider, has confirmed it has suffered a significant cyberattack resulting in a massive data breach. Attackers successfully exfiltrated and leaked approximately 2.3 terabytes of data from the company's systems. The breach has had a severe impact on Almaviva's clients, including Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane, Italy's national railway operator. The compromised data is reported to contain extremely sensitive information, including passenger passport details, employee records, financial documents, and defense-related contracts, posing a serious risk to individual privacy and national security.
The incident appears to be a data theft and extortion attack, although the specific threat actor has not yet been identified. The attackers gained unauthorized access to Almaviva's network, navigated to sensitive data stores, and exfiltrated a vast quantity of information (2.3 TB). This data was subsequently leaked. The wide range of stolen information suggests the attackers spent considerable time inside the network, conducting thorough reconnaissance before exfiltrating the data. The inclusion of data from the national railway and defense-related contracts makes this a particularly high-impact breach.
The initial access vector and specific TTPs used in the attack have not been publicly disclosed. However, the outcome points to a successful intrusion followed by extensive data collection and exfiltration.
T1213 - Data from Information Repositories.T1074 - Data Staged).T1048 - Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.The impact of this breach is severe and multi-faceted:
| Type | Value | Description | Context | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| network_traffic_pattern | * | Sustained, high-volume outbound data transfers from internal servers to unknown external IP addresses. | NetFlow / Firewall Logs / SIEM | high |
| file_name | *.zip, *.rar, *.7z |
The creation of large archive files on servers that do not normally perform such functions can be an indicator of data staging. | File Integrity Monitoring / EDR | medium |
| process_name | 7z.exe, rar.exe |
Execution of compression utilities on servers, especially when initiated by web server processes or service accounts. | EDR / Process Monitoring | medium |
Detection:
D3-UDTA - User Data Transfer Analysis.Response:
Strategic:
D3-FE - File Encryption.Tactical:
Encrypt sensitive data at rest to ensure that even if attackers access the files, the information remains unreadable without the decryption keys.
Use network-based DLP and intrusion prevention systems to detect and block large-scale data exfiltration attempts in real-time.
As a service provider, segmenting client data into separate, isolated environments can prevent a breach in one from affecting all others.
To detect a massive data theft like the one at Almaviva, User Data Transfer Analysis is essential. This involves deploying a Data Loss Prevention (DLP) solution at the network edge and on critical servers. The DLP tool should be configured with policies to identify and inspect data containing sensitive information patterns, such as passport numbers, national ID numbers, and financial record formats relevant to Italy and the EU. Security teams must establish a baseline for normal data transfer volumes and patterns for different parts of the network. Alerts should be configured to trigger on high-volume transfers of sensitive data to external destinations, especially if the destination is an untrusted cloud service or a new IP address. This technique provides a critical opportunity to detect and potentially block a large-scale exfiltration event before 2.3TB of data can leave the network.
As a fundamental mitigation to reduce the impact of a data breach, Almaviva should have implemented strong File Encryption for all sensitive client data at rest. This goes beyond simple disk encryption. Sensitive data, such as the passport information and defense contracts, should be encrypted at the application or database level. This means that even if an attacker bypasses network and server access controls and gets direct access to the database files or file storage, the data itself remains a useless, encrypted blob without access to the corresponding decryption keys. Key management becomes critical; encryption keys must be stored separately and securely, for example in a Hardware Security Module (HSM), with tightly controlled access policies. This control ensures that a breach of the storage layer does not automatically equate to a breach of the data itself.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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