A widespread password spray campaign targeting Microsoft 365 accounts has been attributed to an Iranian Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group, likely Gray Sandstorm (also known as SEABORGIUM/COLDIVER). According to research from Check Point, the attacks targeted government and private sector entities in Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) starting in early March 2026. The campaign's timing and choice of targets—specifically municipalities responsible for civil defense and damage response—strongly correlate with kinetic military operations (missile and drone strikes) launched by Iran. This suggests the cyberattacks were conducted as part of a hybrid warfare strategy, aimed at gathering intelligence to support and assess the impact of physical military actions.
The campaign employed password spraying, a brute-force technique where attackers attempt a small number of common passwords against a large number of user accounts. This "low and slow" method is designed to avoid triggering account lockout policies that would occur from repeated failed logins on a single account.
The primary targets were Microsoft 365 accounts belonging to organizations in Israel and the UAE. The focus on municipalities is particularly notable. These organizations are critical for emergency response and damage assessment following a physical attack. By gaining access to their email accounts and internal documents, the attackers could potentially:
This direct correlation between cyber operations and physical military strikes is a clear example of hybrid warfare, where cyber capabilities are used as a force multiplier for conventional military action.
The core TTPs of this campaign are characteristic of Gray Sandstorm and other similar APTs focused on credential access:
T1110.003 - Brute Force: Password Spraying: This was the primary initial access vector used to compromise accounts at scale.T1078.004 - Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts: Once a correct password was found, the attackers gained access to the legitimate Microsoft 365 cloud account.T1589.002 - Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses: The attackers would have first needed to gather lists of valid email addresses for the target organizations to conduct the password spray attack.T1530 - Data from Cloud Storage Object: After gaining access, the attackers would collect data from sources like Exchange Online (emails) and SharePoint Online (documents).Gray Sandstorm has a documented history of using password spraying as its go-to technique for initial access, making the attribution by Check Point highly plausible.
The impact of this campaign extends beyond a typical data breach, given its connection to military operations:
Detection:
Response:
M1032 - Multi-factor Authentication): This is the single most effective defense against password spraying. Even if the attacker guesses the correct password, they cannot access the account without the second factor. Enforce MFA for all users.M1027 - Password Policies): Implement strong password policies that prohibit the use of common or easily guessable passwords. Use a deny-list of known bad passwords.M1047 - Audit): Ensure that comprehensive logging is enabled for Microsoft 365 and that these logs are ingested into a SIEM for continuous monitoring and alerting.The most effective control to defeat password spraying. Even with a valid password, the attacker is stopped without the second factor.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Enforce strong password requirements and use a password filter to block common and compromised passwords.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
To directly and effectively neutralize the threat from Gray Sandstorm's password spraying campaign, targeted organizations must enforce MFA for all Microsoft 365 accounts. A password spray attack's effectiveness is entirely nullified if a second factor is required for login. Even if the attacker correctly guesses a user's password, they are blocked from accessing the account. For high-value targets like government municipalities, it is crucial to use strong, phishing-resistant MFA methods such as FIDO2 security keys rather than SMS or simple push notifications. This single control is the most important defense against this TTP.
For detection, security teams must configure their SIEM to ingest Microsoft Entra ID sign-in logs and create specific rules to detect password spraying. A high-fidelity rule would be to alert when a single source IP address generates a high number of failed login attempts (e.g., >20) with the error code 50126 (InvalidCredentials) across multiple distinct user accounts (e.g., >10) within a short time frame (e.g., 5 minutes). This pattern is the classic signature of a password spray. Tuning these thresholds to your organization's baseline will provide an early warning of an attack in progress, allowing for rapid response such as blocking the source IP and forcing password resets.
Leverage Microsoft Entra Conditional Access to build policies that block or challenge authentication attempts from untrusted locations. For municipalities in Israel and the UAE, a policy could be created to block all authentication attempts originating from Iranian IP ranges. While attackers can use proxies, this provides a valuable layer of defense. More dynamically, use Entra ID's risk-based policies, which leverage Microsoft's threat intelligence to automatically detect and block logins from anomalous or suspicious locations, effectively automating the analysis of logon patterns and blocking attacks like those from Gray Sandstorm.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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