The incransom ransomware group has added Evolve Mortgage Services to its list of victims, claiming to have stolen over 20 terabytes of highly sensitive data. In a post on their dark web leak site on October 30, 2025, the group stated they exfiltrated vast amounts of data, including databases containing the Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of thousands of U.S. citizens. The attackers are employing a double-extortion tactic, threatening to release the stolen data publicly because the company allegedly refused to negotiate. This attack underscores the persistent and severe threat that data extortion gangs pose to the financial services industry.
The threat actor, incransom, is a known ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation that engages in data theft and extortion. In this case, they claim to have breached Evolve Mortgage Services, a provider of mortgage technology and services. The attackers' primary leverage is the massive trove of data they claim to possess:
The group's public post is a classic extortion tactic, designed to pressure the victim company by creating public and regulatory scrutiny. By stating that Evolve Mortgage Services "disregarded the disclosure" and refused to engage, they attempt to shift blame and coerce payment.
While the specific TTPs for the breach have not been disclosed, IncRansom and similar groups typically follow a well-established attack pattern:
T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application) is a strong possibility.T1567.002 - Exfiltration to Cloud Storage). The claim of 20TB suggests a prolonged exfiltration process over days or weeks.A breach of this magnitude is devastating for a financial services company. The exposure of Social Security numbers and credit histories for thousands of individuals creates a massive liability.
Detecting a large-scale data theft operation involves looking for signs of reconnaissance and exfiltration.
| Type | Value | Description | 
|---|---|---|
| Network Traffic Pattern | Sustained high-volume egress traffic | A 20TB exfiltration would create a noticeable, sustained spike in outbound network traffic over days or weeks, likely to cloud storage provider IP ranges. | 
| Process Name | rclone.exe,megasync.exe | Execution of legitimate cloud sync tools often abused for data exfiltration. | 
| Command Line Pattern | vssadmin create shadow | Command used to create volume shadow copies for data access, often used by ransomware groups before exfiltration. | 
| File Name | *.rar,*.zip | The creation of massive archive files on servers, indicating data is being staged for exfiltration. | 
Detection: Deploy a Network Detection and Response (NDR) solution to baseline and monitor egress traffic. Alerts should be configured for sustained, high-volume data flows to unusual destinations. Use an EDR to monitor for the execution of suspicious commands and tools associated with data staging and exfiltration. A key D3FEND technique is D3-UDTA: User Data Transfer Analysis to flag when a user or system begins transferring abnormal amounts of data.
Response: If a large-scale exfiltration is detected in progress, the immediate priority is to sever the connection. This can be done by blocking the destination IP at the firewall or isolating the source host from the network. The incident response team must then work to identify and evict the attacker from the network and preserve forensic evidence.
Egress Filtering: Strictly control outbound network traffic. Implement a 'default-deny' policy for egress traffic from servers, only allowing connections to known, legitimate destinations. This is a form of M1037 - Filter Network Traffic.
Data Loss Prevention (DLP): Deploy DLP solutions that can detect and block the transfer of sensitive data patterns (like Social Security numbers) in outbound traffic.
Immutable Backups: Maintain offline, immutable backups of all critical data. While this doesn't prevent data theft, it ensures you can recover without paying a ransom if encryption is also deployed.
Network Segmentation: Use M1030 - Network Segmentation to prevent attackers from moving laterally from a compromised workstation to a critical database server.
Implement strict egress filtering to block outbound connections from servers to unauthorized cloud storage providers or other destinations.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Segment the network to prevent attackers from moving from a less secure part of the network to critical database servers.
Maintain a rigorous patch management program to close vulnerabilities in public-facing applications that are often used for initial access.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
The most effective technical control to prevent a 20TB data theft like the one claimed against Evolve Mortgage Services is strict Outbound Traffic Filtering, also known as egress filtering. This should be implemented at the network perimeter firewall with a 'default-deny' posture. For critical servers, especially database and file servers containing PII, all outbound internet access should be blocked by default. If a server requires access to a specific external service (e.g., for updates or API calls), a firewall rule should be created to allow traffic only to that specific IP address and port. This strategy would have made it nearly impossible for the incransom attackers to exfiltrate 20TB of data to their own cloud storage, as the connections would have been blocked at the firewall. This control turns data exfiltration from a stealthy activity into a noisy, failed one, generating logs that can alert security teams to the intrusion attempt.
To detect an in-progress data heist, User Data Transfer Analysis is crucial. This technique, often part of an NDR or UEBA platform, involves baselining the normal amount of data transferred by each user and, more importantly, each server. A database server might receive many queries, but its outbound data transfer volume should be relatively predictable. A rule should be configured to trigger a high-severity alert if a server's outbound data transfer volume exceeds its daily baseline by a significant margin (e.g., 3-5 standard deviations) or if a sustained, high-volume transfer continues for an extended period (e.g., >10GB in an hour). This provides a clear, quantifiable signal of data exfiltration that is difficult for an attacker to hide when stealing terabytes of data. This allows the security team to detect and respond to the theft before it is complete.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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