Freedom Mobile Data Breach Exposes Customer PII via Compromised Subcontractor

Freedom Mobile Discloses Data Breach After Attacker Uses Compromised Subcontractor Account to Access Customer Data

MEDIUM
December 4, 2025
4m read
Data BreachSupply Chain AttackPhishing

Impact Scope

People Affected

Limited number of customers

Affected Companies

Freedom Mobile

Industries Affected

Telecommunications

Geographic Impact

Canada (national)

Related Entities

Full Report

Executive Summary

Freedom Mobile, Canada's fourth-largest wireless carrier, has disclosed a data breach that exposed the personal information of a subset of its customers. The company announced on December 3, 2025, that it detected the unauthorized access on October 23, 2025. The investigation revealed that the threat actor gained entry by using a compromised account belonging to one of the company's subcontractors. The exposed data includes customer Personally Identifiable Information (PII) such as names, addresses, and dates of birth. Freedom Mobile has stated that financial information and account passwords were not compromised. The company is in the process of notifying affected customers and has implemented additional security measures to secure its platform.


Threat Overview

This incident is a classic example of a supply chain attack, where an organization is breached through a trusted third-party vendor or partner. The attack vector was a compromised account of a subcontractor, which highlights the security risks associated with third-party access to sensitive systems.

  • Attack Vector: The attacker used legitimate, albeit stolen, credentials from a subcontractor to log into Freedom Mobile's customer account management platform.
  • Attacker Objective: The primary objective appears to have been data theft for the purpose of identity fraud or targeted phishing campaigns.
  • Incident Response: Upon detection, Freedom Mobile blocked the compromised accounts and suspicious IP addresses and engaged in remediation efforts.

Technical Analysis

The core of this attack lies in the exploitation of trusted relationships, a technique tracked by MITRE as T1199 - Trusted Relationship. By compromising a subcontractor, the attacker bypassed perimeter defenses and appeared as a legitimate user. Once inside, they likely used the platform's intended functionality to access and exfiltrate customer data.

The exposed data includes:

  • Full Names
  • Home Addresses
  • Dates of Birth
  • Phone Numbers
  • Freedom Mobile Account Numbers

Crucially, the company asserts that passwords, PINs, and credit card information were not accessed, which significantly reduces the risk of immediate financial fraud. However, the stolen PII is more than sufficient to conduct sophisticated social engineering and phishing attacks.

Impact Assessment

While Freedom Mobile describes the number of affected customers as 'limited', the impact on those individuals could be significant. The stolen data is a valuable commodity for cybercriminals and can be used for:

  • Targeted Phishing (Spear Phishing): Attackers can use the stolen account details to craft highly convincing phishing emails or SMS messages (smishing) pretending to be from Freedom Mobile or another trusted entity.
  • Identity Theft: The combination of name, address, and date of birth is often enough to attempt to open fraudulent accounts or pass identity verification checks.
  • SIM Swapping Attacks: While PINs were not exposed, the other personal data could be used to socially engineer customer service representatives to perform an unauthorized SIM swap, giving attackers control over the victim's phone number.

For Freedom Mobile, the breach results in reputational damage, customer churn, and the costs associated with incident response, legal fees, and potential regulatory fines.

Detection & Response

  • Third-Party Access Monitoring: Organizations must rigorously monitor all access from third-party accounts. This includes baselining normal activity and alerting on deviations, such as logins from unusual IP addresses, access at odd hours, or an unusually high volume of data access. D3FEND's D3-UGLPA: User Geolocation Logon Pattern Analysis is a relevant technique.
  • Least Privilege Principle: Subcontractor accounts should be strictly limited to accessing only the data and systems absolutely necessary for their job function. This can limit the blast radius if an account is compromised.
  • Customer Notification: Affected customers should be advised to enable multi-factor authentication on their Freedom Mobile accounts and be extremely cautious of any unsolicited communications asking for personal information.

Mitigation

  1. Enforce MFA for Third Parties: Mandate the use of multi-factor authentication for all third-party and subcontractor accounts that have access to internal systems or customer data. This is the single most effective control against credential compromise.
  2. Vendor Risk Management: Implement a comprehensive third-party risk management program. This should include security assessments of all subcontractors before granting them access and periodic reviews of their security posture.
  3. Network Segmentation: Isolate the systems that third parties can access from the rest of the corporate network. This prevents a compromise in one area from spreading to more critical systems.
  4. Session Monitoring: Implement session duration limits and inactivity timeouts for third-party accounts to reduce the window of opportunity for an attacker using a hijacked session.

Timeline of Events

1
January 1, 2019
Freedom Mobile experienced a previous data breach due to an unsecured database, exposing data of ~15,000 customers.
2
October 23, 2025
Freedom Mobile detects unauthorized access to its customer account management platform.
3
December 3, 2025
Freedom Mobile publicly discloses the data breach.
4
December 4, 2025
This article was published

MITRE ATT&CK Mitigations

Mandating MFA for all third-party access is the most effective way to prevent the use of compromised credentials.

Apply the principle of least privilege to all third-party accounts, ensuring they can only access the specific data and systems required for their function.

Audit

M1047enterprise

Implement comprehensive logging and monitoring of all third-party account activity to detect anomalous behavior.

D3FEND Defensive Countermeasures

To directly counter the attack vector used in the Freedom Mobile breach, organizations must enforce strong MFA for all external access, especially for third-party contractors and vendors. This should not be optional. If a subcontractor's credentials are stolen, MFA acts as a critical backstop, preventing the attacker from logging in. This policy should apply to VPN access, cloud dashboards, and any application that houses sensitive or customer data. For Freedom Mobile, mandating MFA for all subcontractor accounts accessing the customer management platform would likely have prevented this breach entirely.

Implement a User and Entity Behavior Analytics (UEBA) solution to monitor access patterns for all accounts, with a special focus on third-party users. The system should baseline normal behavior for each subcontractor account: what data they typically access, how much data they access, what times they log in, and from what geographic locations. The system should then generate alerts for any significant deviation from this baseline. For example, an alert could be triggered if a subcontractor account that normally views 10 customer records per day suddenly accesses 1,000, or if an account that always logs in from Canada suddenly authenticates from an IP in Eastern Europe. This allows for the detection of a compromised account even if the attacker is using valid credentials.

Sources & References

Freedom Mobile discloses data breach exposing customer data
BleepingComputer (bleepingcomputer.com) December 3, 2025
Personal Information Compromised in Freedom Mobile Data Breach
SecurityWeek (securityweek.com) December 4, 2025
Freedom Mobile reports breach involving customer information
SC Magazine (scmagazine.com) December 4, 2025

Article Author

Jason Gomes

Jason Gomes

• Cybersecurity Practitioner

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.

Threat Intelligence & AnalysisSecurity Orchestration (SOAR/XSOAR)Incident Response & Digital ForensicsSecurity Operations Center (SOC)SIEM & Security AnalyticsCyber Fusion & Threat SharingSecurity Automation & IntegrationManaged Detection & Response (MDR)

Tags

Data BreachFreedom MobileSupply Chain AttackThird-Party RiskPIICanada

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