Financial Sector Warned of Systemic Supply Chain Risk and 'Indirect Ransomware'

Report Highlights Systemic Supply Chain Risk and Rise of 'Indirect Ransomware' in Financial Sector

HIGH
January 11, 2026
5m read
Threat IntelligenceSupply Chain AttackPolicy and Compliance

Related Entities

Threat Actors

NoName057(16)Lazarus Group

Organizations

Bangladesh Central BankENISA Kaspersky SecurityScorecard

Products & Tech

DORA (Digital Operational Resilience Act)

Other

SitusAMCLa PosteLa Banque Postale

Full Report

Executive Summary

A comprehensive threat intelligence report for 2025-2026 has highlighted severe and systemic cyber risks facing the global financial sector. The two most prominent threats identified are supply chain compromises and a new evolution of ransomware tactics. According to SecurityScorecard data cited in the report, a staggering 97% of major U.S. banks and 100% of European financial groups suffered at least one breach originating from a third-party supplier in 2024. This systemic weakness is being exploited by threat actors through a method termed "indirect ransomware," where a less secure partner is compromised to gain access to a well-defended financial institution. The report also emphasizes ongoing threats from geopolitical actors, including DDoS attacks from pro-Russian hacktivists like NoName057(16) and major heist attempts by the North Korean APT Lazarus Group.

Regulatory Details

The report notes that while regulations like the EU's Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) are designed to address third-party and supply chain risk, they do not provide operational immunity. Major supply chain attacks like SolarWinds and MOVEit affected many organizations that were compliant with existing standards, proving that regulatory compliance alone is not a substitute for robust, adaptive security practices. DORA mandates that financial institutions map their third-party dependencies, conduct risk assessments, and ensure contracts include specific cybersecurity clauses, but the ultimate responsibility for security remains with the institution.

Threat Overview

Supply Chain Risk

The financial sector's heavy reliance on third-party vendors for services ranging from real estate management to software development has created a massive, interconnected attack surface. The compromise of real estate services provider SitusAMC in November 2025, which led to data exfiltration from its banking clients, is presented as a key example of this risk. Attackers are increasingly finding it easier to breach these smaller, often less-secure, vendors to pivot into the networks of their primary, high-value financial targets. This aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1199 - Trusted Relationship.

Evolving Ransomware Tactics

The report details the rise of "indirect ransomware." Instead of launching a frontal assault on a bank's hardened perimeter, ransomware groups compromise a trusted supplier that has legitimate access to the bank's network or data. They then use this trusted connection to deploy ransomware or exfiltrate data, bypassing many traditional defenses.

Geopolitical Threats

  • Pro-Russian Hacktivists: Groups like NoName057(16) continue to launch politically motivated Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks (T1498 - Network Denial of Service) against European financial institutions, such as the attacks on La Poste and La Banque Postale in France.
  • State-Sponsored Theft: North Korea's Lazarus Group remains a top-tier threat, identified by ENISA as the primary state-aligned actor targeting EU financial institutions for large-scale theft, exemplified by their infamous $81 million heist from Bangladesh's central bank.

Impact Assessment

The systemic nature of supply chain risk means that a single breach at a key vendor can have a cascading effect, impacting dozens of financial institutions simultaneously. This creates a concentrated risk that threatens the stability of the financial ecosystem. The rise of indirect ransomware further complicates defense, as it shifts the initial point of compromise outside the direct control of the target organization's security team. The financial and reputational damage from these attacks is immense, and the continued success of these tactics indicates a persistent and growing threat.

Compliance Guidance

To comply with regulations like DORA and effectively manage these threats, financial institutions must go beyond contractual assurances.

  1. Continuous Vendor Monitoring: Implement solutions to continuously monitor the security posture of all third-party vendors. This includes external scanning, dark web monitoring, and requiring evidence of security controls.
  2. Zero Trust for Third Parties: Apply a Zero Trust architecture to all third-party connections. Grant vendors the absolute minimum level of access required for their function (least privilege) and inspect all traffic to and from their networks.
  3. Supply Chain Incident Response Planning: Develop and test incident response playbooks specifically for supply chain compromises. These plans should include clear communication protocols and coordinated response actions with key vendors.

Mitigation Recommendations

  • Defense in Depth: Assume a supplier will be breached. Implement controls within your own network, such as network segmentation and data loss prevention (DLP), to contain a breach that originates from a trusted partner.
  • Threat Intelligence: Proactively hunt for threats within the supply chain by leveraging threat intelligence to identify which vendors are being targeted or discussed by threat actors.
  • DDoS Protection: Maintain contracts with cloud-based DDoS mitigation services to defend against attacks from hacktivist groups.

Timeline of Events

1
January 1, 2024
Data from 2024 shows 97% of U.S. banks and 100% of European financial groups were breached via a third-party supplier.
2
November 1, 2025
Real estate services provider SitusAMC was compromised, leading to data exfiltration from its banking clients.
3
December 1, 2025
Pro-Russian hacktivists launch DDoS attacks against French institutions La Poste and La Banque Postale.
4
January 11, 2026
This article was published

MITRE ATT&CK Mitigations

Applying Zero Trust principles and strict network segmentation to all third-party connections is crucial to limit the blast radius of a supply chain compromise.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

While focused on internal systems, this principle extends to third-party risk management, where continuous monitoring of vendors' external attack surfaces is necessary.

Using network-based detection to monitor traffic from third-party connections for anomalous behavior can help detect a compromised supplier being used as a pivot point.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

D3FEND Defensive Countermeasures

Financial institutions must treat all third-party connections as untrusted and enforce strict network isolation. Instead of granting broad VPN access, a Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) model should be adopted. Each vendor connection should only be able to reach the specific applications and ports necessary for their function, and all other access should be denied by default. For example, a supplier managing real estate data should have no network path to the bank's core transaction processing systems. This containment strategy is the most effective way to mitigate the threat of 'indirect ransomware,' as it prevents an attacker who has compromised a supplier from moving laterally into the bank's critical network segments.

Implement User and Entity Behavior Analytics (UEBA) to monitor all activity from third-party accounts and connections. The system should baseline normal behavior for each vendor—what systems they access, what data they touch, the volume of data they transfer, and the hours they operate. Alerts should be generated for any significant deviation. For instance, if a vendor account that normally only accesses a single application suddenly starts trying to scan the network or access a different database, it is a strong indicator of compromise. This behavioral analysis can detect an attacker using a legitimate vendor connection for malicious purposes, providing an early warning before data is exfiltrated or ransomware is deployed.

Article Author

Jason Gomes

Jason Gomes

• Cybersecurity Practitioner

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.

Threat Intelligence & AnalysisSecurity Orchestration (SOAR/XSOAR)Incident Response & Digital ForensicsSecurity Operations Center (SOC)SIEM & Security AnalyticsCyber Fusion & Threat SharingSecurity Automation & IntegrationManaged Detection & Response (MDR)

Tags

Supply ChainIndirect RansomwareDORAFinancial ServicesThreat ReportThird-Party Risk

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