A comprehensive threat intelligence report for 2025-2026 has highlighted severe and systemic cyber risks facing the global financial sector. The two most prominent threats identified are supply chain compromises and a new evolution of ransomware tactics. According to SecurityScorecard data cited in the report, a staggering 97% of major U.S. banks and 100% of European financial groups suffered at least one breach originating from a third-party supplier in 2024. This systemic weakness is being exploited by threat actors through a method termed "indirect ransomware," where a less secure partner is compromised to gain access to a well-defended financial institution. The report also emphasizes ongoing threats from geopolitical actors, including DDoS attacks from pro-Russian hacktivists like NoName057(16) and major heist attempts by the North Korean APT Lazarus Group.
The report notes that while regulations like the EU's Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) are designed to address third-party and supply chain risk, they do not provide operational immunity. Major supply chain attacks like SolarWinds and MOVEit affected many organizations that were compliant with existing standards, proving that regulatory compliance alone is not a substitute for robust, adaptive security practices. DORA mandates that financial institutions map their third-party dependencies, conduct risk assessments, and ensure contracts include specific cybersecurity clauses, but the ultimate responsibility for security remains with the institution.
The financial sector's heavy reliance on third-party vendors for services ranging from real estate management to software development has created a massive, interconnected attack surface. The compromise of real estate services provider SitusAMC in November 2025, which led to data exfiltration from its banking clients, is presented as a key example of this risk. Attackers are increasingly finding it easier to breach these smaller, often less-secure, vendors to pivot into the networks of their primary, high-value financial targets. This aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1199 - Trusted Relationship.
The report details the rise of "indirect ransomware." Instead of launching a frontal assault on a bank's hardened perimeter, ransomware groups compromise a trusted supplier that has legitimate access to the bank's network or data. They then use this trusted connection to deploy ransomware or exfiltrate data, bypassing many traditional defenses.
T1498 - Network Denial of Service) against European financial institutions, such as the attacks on La Poste and La Banque Postale in France.The systemic nature of supply chain risk means that a single breach at a key vendor can have a cascading effect, impacting dozens of financial institutions simultaneously. This creates a concentrated risk that threatens the stability of the financial ecosystem. The rise of indirect ransomware further complicates defense, as it shifts the initial point of compromise outside the direct control of the target organization's security team. The financial and reputational damage from these attacks is immense, and the continued success of these tactics indicates a persistent and growing threat.
To comply with regulations like DORA and effectively manage these threats, financial institutions must go beyond contractual assurances.
Applying Zero Trust principles and strict network segmentation to all third-party connections is crucial to limit the blast radius of a supply chain compromise.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
While focused on internal systems, this principle extends to third-party risk management, where continuous monitoring of vendors' external attack surfaces is necessary.
Using network-based detection to monitor traffic from third-party connections for anomalous behavior can help detect a compromised supplier being used as a pivot point.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Financial institutions must treat all third-party connections as untrusted and enforce strict network isolation. Instead of granting broad VPN access, a Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) model should be adopted. Each vendor connection should only be able to reach the specific applications and ports necessary for their function, and all other access should be denied by default. For example, a supplier managing real estate data should have no network path to the bank's core transaction processing systems. This containment strategy is the most effective way to mitigate the threat of 'indirect ransomware,' as it prevents an attacker who has compromised a supplier from moving laterally into the bank's critical network segments.
Implement User and Entity Behavior Analytics (UEBA) to monitor all activity from third-party accounts and connections. The system should baseline normal behavior for each vendor—what systems they access, what data they touch, the volume of data they transfer, and the hours they operate. Alerts should be generated for any significant deviation. For instance, if a vendor account that normally only accesses a single application suddenly starts trying to scan the network or access a different database, it is a strong indicator of compromise. This behavioral analysis can detect an attacker using a legitimate vendor connection for malicious purposes, providing an early warning before data is exfiltrated or ransomware is deployed.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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