In early February 2026, a new extortion group named 0APT targeted Epworth HealthCare, a major Australian private hospital network, with a public extortion attempt. The group claimed on its darknet leak site to have exfiltrated 920GB of sensitive data, including patient records and financial information, threatening to release it if a ransom was not paid. Following an immediate and thorough investigation, Epworth HealthCare found no evidence of a system compromise or data breach. Cybersecurity researchers have analyzed 0APT's activities and concluded the group is a "fake" ransomware operation. Instead of performing actual data theft, 0APT fabricates claims and uses psychological tactics and public pressure to coerce victims into paying, marking an evolution in extortion techniques that bypasses the need for sophisticated technical intrusions.
Unlike traditional ransomware gangs, 0APT does not appear to engage in network exploitation, deploying malware, or exfiltrating data. The technical analysis focuses on their disinformation tactics:
The 0APT operation represents a low-cost, high-leverage extortion model. It bypasses the significant technical hurdles of breaching a secure network and instead weaponizes fear, uncertainty, and doubt (FUD) as its primary tool.
While no technical intrusion occurred, the group's actions align with the objectives of several ATT&CK techniques:
T1591.004 - Gather Victim Org Information: Identify Roles: The group likely performs basic reconnaissance to identify high-value targets in sensitive sectors like healthcare, where the reputational impact of a data breach is severe.T1589 - Gather Victim Identity Information: The attackers gather enough information about the organization to make their claims appear plausible.T1486 - Data Encrypted for Impact: Although no data was encrypted, the group's entire operation is predicated on the threat of data being made public, which is the second stage of modern double-extortion ransomware attacks that this technique covers.Even though no data was stolen, the impact on a targeted organization can be significant:
Detecting a bluff attack is challenging as there are no technical indicators of compromise (IOCs) on the network. Response must focus on verification and communication.
Mitigation against bluff attacks is primarily about preparedness and resilience.
Comprehensive auditing and logging of network traffic, data access, and endpoint activity are crucial to quickly verify or disprove breach claims.
Training for leadership and communications teams on how to handle extortion and public breach claims is critical to managing the reputational impact of a bluff attack.
Proactive threat intelligence monitoring for mentions of the organization on dark web forums is a pre-compromise activity that can provide early warning.
To effectively counter a bluff extortion attempt like the one from 0APT, an organization must be able to prove a negative: that no data exfiltration occurred. Implementing comprehensive Network Traffic Analysis (NTA) is key. Security teams should use NTA tools and Data Loss Prevention (DLP) solutions to establish a clear baseline of normal outbound traffic patterns from critical data repositories. When a breach is claimed, analysts can quickly query historical network flow data (e.g., NetFlow, sFlow) for any anomalous spikes in data egress to external IP addresses, especially around the time of the alleged incident. For a claim of a 920GB theft, the network signature would be massive and unmistakable. Having this visibility allows the organization to state with high confidence that no such event took place, effectively neutralizing the attacker's leverage. This capability turns the investigation from a frantic search into a quick verification process.
Deploying decoy objects, or honeytokens, within sensitive data stores provides a high-fidelity alerting mechanism for actual data breaches. In the context of the Epworth HealthCare scenario, the IT team could seed their patient database with fake patient records containing unique, non-public identifiers (e.g., a specific email address, a fake patient ID). These honeytokens should be configured to trigger an immediate alert if accessed or used anywhere outside the secure environment. If a threat actor like 0APT were to make a claim and provide a data sample containing one of these honeytokens, the organization would have instant, undeniable proof of a breach. Conversely, if an attacker provides samples and none of them contain honeytokens, it increases the likelihood that the claim is a bluff. This D3FEND technique provides a definitive tripwire that helps distinguish real intrusions from fake ones.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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