On January 20, 2026, the European Commission proposed a significant revision to the EU's Cybersecurity Act, known as CSA 2. This legislative initiative aims to create a unified framework for identifying and mitigating security risks within the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) supply chain across 18 critical infrastructure sectors. The core of the proposal is the power to phase out and ban high-risk technology suppliers, a measure widely seen as targeting Chinese companies like Huawei and ZTE, to enhance the EU's strategic autonomy and resilience against cyber threats. The act mandates a three-year timeline for mobile operators to replace equipment from designated high-risk vendors and seeks to simplify cybersecurity certification to promote 'secure-by-design' principles across the Union. This represents a major shift from a voluntary to a more prescriptive and enforceable cybersecurity posture for the entire EU.
The proposed revision, referred to as CSA 2, significantly expands upon the original 2019 Cybersecurity Act. Its primary objective is to establish a robust legal mechanism for the EU and its member states to collectively assess and manage risks in the ICT supply chain. The regulation will apply to 18 critical sectors, including but not limited to energy, telecommunications, transportation, health, and security scanning services.
A key provision is the creation of a formal process to designate specific technology suppliers as 'high-risk'. This designation will be based on a risk assessment considering factors such as the likelihood of the supplier being subject to interference from a non-EU country, the supplier's corporate structure, and its ability to assure supply. While no countries are named, the context strongly implies that this is directed at companies from nations like China.
Once a vendor is listed as high-risk, member states will be empowered and, in some cases, mandated to restrict their products from critical systems. For mobile telecommunications, the act explicitly requires operators to phase out high-risk equipment from both core and access network infrastructure within a three-year period following the publication of the vendor list. This formalizes and strengthens the recommendations previously outlined in the EU's 5G Security Toolbox.
The regulation will have a broad impact across the European Union. The primary entities affected include:
CSA 2 introduces more prescriptive compliance obligations compared to its predecessor. Key requirements include:
The business and operational impacts of CSA 2 will be substantial.
While specific penalties are still to be finalized, enforcement will be handled at the member state level, with coordination from the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA). Non-compliance could result in substantial fines, similar to those under GDPR, and legal orders to cease using non-compliant equipment. The strengthened mandate of ENISA will allow for more effective cross-border supervision and support for national authorities in enforcing the regulation.
Organizations should take the following proactive steps:
The act's focus on certification and secure-by-design aligns with the principles of identifying and remediating vulnerabilities in products before they enter the supply chain.
The regulation implicitly promotes the use of supported and up-to-date software and hardware from trusted vendors, which is a key aspect of patch management.
While D3FEND's Domain Trust Policy typically applies to Active Directory, its principles can be conceptually extended to the geopolitical and supply chain context of the revised Cybersecurity Act. In this macro sense, the EU is establishing a 'supply chain trust policy' that defines which external entities (technology vendors from specific nations) are trusted to operate within its critical infrastructure 'domain'. Implementing this involves creating and enforcing strict procurement policies that explicitly forbid the use of hardware and software from vendors designated as 'high-risk' by the European Commission. Organizations should begin by inventorying all ICT assets and mapping them to their vendors and country of origin. This inventory will form the basis for a gap analysis against the forthcoming EU regulations. A strategic plan should then be developed to replace non-compliant technology, prioritizing systems within the 18 critical sectors identified by the act. This policy should be integrated into all procurement and vendor management workflows to ensure ongoing compliance.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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