A new Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) group, DragonForce, has been identified and is being monitored by security analysts. The group is notable for its strategy, which involves building its malware on the leaked source code of two of the most infamous ransomware families in history: LockBit 3.0 and Conti. DragonForce is marketing its services to affiliates via a platform named 'Ransombay' and appears to be consolidating power by absorbing smaller ransomware operations. This development highlights the continued evolution and industrialization of the ransomware threat, where dismantled groups' tools are quickly repurposed by new actors.
The emergence of DragonForce as a self-proclaimed "ransomware cartel" is a significant development. By leveraging the proven and effective codebases of LockBit and Conti, the group can bypass much of the initial development effort and immediately deploy a sophisticated and feature-rich ransomware payload. This allows them to focus on recruitment, operations, and marketing their 'Ransombay' platform to a wide pool of potential affiliates. The strategy of absorbing rival groups suggests an ambition to quickly become a dominant player in the RaaS market, similar to how Conti operated at its peak.
While specific attacks have not yet been detailed, the malware's lineage provides insight into its likely capabilities:
T1490 - Inhibit System Recovery).T1608.003 - Install Digital Certificate).The emergence of a well-organized group like DragonForce, armed with top-tier ransomware code, increases the threat level for organizations globally. The group's professionalized approach and RaaS model mean we can expect an increase in the frequency and scale of attacks as they onboard more affiliates. The use of proven code means that many existing defenses may be challenged. The cartel-like strategy could also lead to less competition and more collaboration among top-tier criminals, further refining their TTPs and increasing their success rate.
| Type | Value | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Threat Actor | DragonForce | The name of the new RaaS group. |
| Malware | Ransombay | The name of the RaaS platform operated by DragonForce. |
As DragonForce uses Conti and LockBit code, observables for those families are relevant for hunting:
| Type | Value | Description | Context | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| command_line_pattern | vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet |
Classic ransomware behavior to prevent system restore. A key indicator for LockBit and Conti. | EDR logs, PowerShell logs | high |
| file_name | *.lockbit |
The file extension used by LockBit. DragonForce may adopt a similar or new unique extension. | File integrity monitoring | medium |
| process_name | rundll32.exe |
Conti was known to use rundll32.exe to execute its malicious DLL. Monitor for this process spawning from unusual parent processes. | EDR process relationship monitoring | medium |
| string_pattern | Conti or LockBit |
The leaked source code may still contain strings or artifacts from the original malware families. | Memory scanning with YARA, static file analysis | low |
D3-PA): Since the code is based on known families, existing behavioral rules in EDRs for detecting Conti and LockBit should be effective against DragonForce, provided they haven't significantly altered the core logic.Defenses against DragonForce are the same as for other top-tier ransomware groups:
Use modern EDR solutions with behavioral detection capabilities to identify ransomware activities, as signatures will be less effective against repurposed code.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Enforce MFA everywhere to protect against the common affiliate tactic of using stolen credentials for initial access.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Strictly control and monitor the use of domain admin and other privileged accounts to limit the blast radius of an attack.
Given that DragonForce is built on the DNA of Conti and LockBit, the most effective detection strategy is to focus on their known behaviors. Deploy an EDR solution and ensure it is tuned to detect the specific TTPs of these families. This includes creating high-priority alerts for: 1) Processes deleting volume shadow copies (vssadmin.exe delete shadows). 2) Attempts to stop or kill security products and database services. 3) Rapid file enumeration and encryption activity originating from a single process. Because DragonForce is a new variant, signature-based detection will fail, but behavioral analysis based on its well-understood predecessors will remain highly effective.
Deploy deception technology, including decoy systems and user accounts (honeytokens), throughout the network. Since ransomware affiliates must perform discovery and lateral movement, they are likely to interact with these decoys. A honeytoken domain admin account that is never used for legitimate purposes can be created; any authentication attempt with this account is a high-fidelity indicator of compromise. Similarly, decoy network shares filled with fake documents can be set up. Any access to these shares should trigger an immediate alert, providing early warning that an attacker is moving through the network, long before they deploy the DragonForce payload.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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