On November 27, 2025, food delivery platform DoorDash confirmed it had sustained another data breach. The incident originated not from a direct attack on DoorDash's own systems, but from a security compromise at one of its third-party vendors. The unauthorized access at the vendor allowed attackers to view and potentially exfiltrate data belonging to DoorDash customers and drivers ('Dashers'). This event is the latest in a pattern of supply-chain security failures for the company, renewing scrutiny of its vendor risk management practices and the overall security of its extensive partner ecosystem.
The breach exemplifies a classic supply-chain attack, where adversaries target a weaker link in the chain—in this case, a third-party service provider—to gain access to the data of a larger, more valuable target. While DoorDash has not named the compromised vendor, such partners often provide services like customer support, communications (e.g., SMS notifications), or marketing, and are frequently granted API access or credentials to the primary company's systems. By compromising the vendor, attackers effectively inherited their trusted access to DoorDash's data.
The primary MITRE ATT&CK technique at play here is T1199 - Trusted Relationship. The attackers exploited the implicit trust and established access between DoorDash and its vendor. The attack likely unfolded as follows:
Strictly manage the lifecycle and permissions of all third-party service accounts, ensuring they adhere to the principle of least privilege.
Restrict vendor access to only the specific data and API endpoints required for their function, and deny all other access by default.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
To detect the abuse of third-party vendor credentials, DoorDash should implement continuous analysis of resource access patterns for all service accounts and API keys. By establishing a baseline of normal activity—what data is accessed, how much, from where, and when—for each vendor, deviations can be quickly identified. For instance, if a vendor that normally only accesses driver location data suddenly starts querying customer PII, or if its data access volume spikes by 1000%, a high-fidelity alert should be triggered. This behavioral approach is essential for catching attackers who are using legitimate, stolen credentials, as signature-based methods will fail.
DoorDash must enforce the principle of least privilege for all third-party integrations through strict application configuration hardening. This means that every API key and service account provided to a vendor must be scoped with the minimum possible permissions. For example, if a vendor only needs to send SMS notifications, its API key should only have permission to access the 'send_sms' endpoint and nothing else. It should not be able to read customer data. By configuring these granular permissions at the application layer, the potential impact of a vendor compromise is drastically limited. An attacker who steals the key can only perform the limited functions it was granted, preventing a widespread data breach.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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