Global advertising and PR giant Dentsu announced on October 30, 2025, that its prominent US-based subsidiary, Merkle, has suffered a cyberattack resulting in a data breach. Merkle, a leader in the data-driven Customer Experience Management (CXM) space, handles vast amounts of sensitive client and consumer data, making this a potentially significant incident. Upon detecting the intrusion, Dentsu's security team took immediate action to contain the threat by shutting down affected systems. It has been confirmed that both internal staff data and client data were exposed during the attack.
The incident was first identified when Dentsu's security monitoring detected "abnormal activity" within a part of Merkle's network. This indicates that a threat actor had successfully breached the company's defenses and was active within their environment. While Dentsu has not yet attributed the attack to a specific group or disclosed the attack vector, the proactive shutdown of systems suggests an active intrusion, possibly by a ransomware group in the process of data exfiltration or lateral movement. The exposed data includes both employee information and, more critically, client data, which could encompass a wide range of PII and consumer analytics information managed by Merkle.
Given the lack of specific details, a potential attack scenario can be constructed based on common TTPs used against large corporations and their subsidiaries.
T1566 - Phishing), exploitation of a vulnerability in a public-facing system (T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application), or use of stolen credentials acquired from infostealer logs.T1078 - Valid Accounts to move through the network.T1048 - Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol or T1567 - Exfiltration Over Web Service. The detection of "abnormal activity" likely relates to this data movement.The impact on Merkle and its parent company Dentsu could be substantial. As a CXM company, Merkle's entire business model is built on trust and the secure handling of client data. A breach of this nature severely damages that trust.
Hunting for similar intrusions involves looking for signs of post-compromise activity.
| Type | Value | Description | 
|---|---|---|
| Network Traffic Pattern | Large Egress Data Transfers | Unusually large outbound data flows from internal servers to unknown external destinations. | 
| Command Line Pattern | net group "Domain Admins" /domain | Reconnaissance commands used by attackers to enumerate privileged groups. | 
| Process Name | mimikatz.exe | Execution of credential dumping tools. | 
| Log Source | VPN/SSO Logs | Logins from unusual geographic locations or multiple failed logins followed by a success. | 
Detection: Dentsu's detection of "abnormal activity" highlights the importance of a mature security operations program. Key technologies include EDR for endpoint visibility, NDR for monitoring network traffic (especially east-west and egress), and a SIEM for correlating alerts. D3FEND's D3-PA: Process Analysis is crucial for spotting malicious tools or legitimate tools being used maliciously on endpoints.
Response: The company's decision to proactively shut down systems was a critical containment step. This action, while disruptive, prevents further data exfiltration and lateral movement. A well-rehearsed incident response plan enables such decisive action. The next steps will involve a full forensic investigation to determine the scope, notifying affected parties, and remediation of the security gaps that allowed the initial intrusion.
Preventing such attacks requires a defense-in-depth strategy, particularly for high-value subsidiaries.
Supply Chain / Subsidiary Risk Management: Large corporations must treat their subsidiaries as part of their own security perimeter, enforcing the same security standards and controls across the entire organization. This includes centralized logging and monitoring.
Network Segmentation: Implement M1030 - Network Segmentation to isolate the subsidiary's network from the parent company and to create secure enclaves around critical data stores within the subsidiary itself. This limits an attacker's ability to move laterally.
Access Control: Enforce the principle of least privilege. Accounts should only have access to the data and systems necessary for their role. Use strong MFA (M1032 - Multi-factor Authentication) for all remote access and privileged accounts.
Isolate subsidiary networks from the parent corporate network and segment critical data assets to contain breaches.
Implement centralized logging and monitoring (SIEM, EDR, NDR) across all subsidiaries to detect 'abnormal activity' early.
Enforce the principle of least privilege and closely monitor the use of administrative accounts.
To prevent an incident at a subsidiary like Merkle from escalating into a corporate-wide crisis, strict Broadcast Domain Isolation is essential. This means treating the subsidiary network as an untrusted, third-party network from the perspective of the parent company, Dentsu. All network traffic between Merkle and Dentsu must pass through a firewall or security gateway where it is inspected. There should be no flat network connections or shared administrative domains. Furthermore, within Merkle's own network, micro-segmentation should be used to create isolated enclaves around databases and servers containing sensitive client data. By implementing a 'default-deny' policy for east-west traffic and only allowing communication on a need-to-know basis, the company can significantly limit an attacker's ability to move laterally after an initial compromise, containing the breach to a small segment of the network.
Detecting the 'abnormal activity' that signaled the Merkle breach relies on Resource Access Pattern Analysis. This involves using a UEBA or advanced SIEM to baseline normal access patterns for users and service accounts to critical resources, such as Merkle's client data repositories. The system should learn which accounts access which data, at what times, and from which locations. An alert should be triggered when a significant deviation occurs. For example: 1) A user account that typically only accesses data for Client A suddenly attempts to access data for Client B, C, and D. 2) A large volume of data is accessed by an account outside of normal business hours. 3) A service account starts accessing data in a way that is inconsistent with its application's function. This behavioral analysis is key to detecting an insider threat or a compromised account being used by an attacker for reconnaissance and data staging.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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