A sophisticated and growing threat is blurring the lines between cybercrime and physical crime, with threat actors systematically targeting the logistics and transportation industry to orchestrate large-scale cargo theft. Recent research details a methodology where attackers infiltrate trucking and freight companies, often using social engineering to deploy legitimate Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools like ScreenConnect and PDQ Connect. With this digital foothold, the criminals gain access to the carrier's operational platforms and digital 'load boards.' They then use this access to divert real, high-value shipments to locations where organized crime associates are waiting to steal the physical goods. This cyber-enabled approach is reportedly responsible for a significant portion of the estimated $35 billion lost annually to cargo theft in the U.S., posing a major threat to the global supply chain.
This hybrid attack represents a significant evolution in cargo theft, moving from traditional strong-arm tactics to sophisticated digital manipulation. The core of the threat is the exploitation of the trust and efficiency of modern digital logistics platforms.
The attack chain typically unfolds as follows:
T1219 - Remote Access Software), the attackers gain persistent access to the carrier's computers and, by extension, their logistics management software.The technical linchpin of this operation is the abuse of legitimate RMM software. These tools are designed for IT administrators to remotely manage systems, so they are often trusted and may not be flagged by traditional antivirus software. By using tools like ScreenConnect, attackers gain the same level of control as an administrator, allowing them to:
This is a classic 'living off the land' (LotL) technique, where attackers use tools already present or accepted in the environment to achieve their objectives, making detection more difficult. The initial access vector relies on standard social engineering and phishing (T1566 - Phishing).
No specific Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) were provided in the source articles.
| Type | Value | Description | Context | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| process_name | ScreenConnect.Client.exe, PDQConnect.exe |
Execution of legitimate RMM tools that are not part of the organization's standard toolset. | Monitor process creation events. Maintain an allowlist of approved RMM software. | high |
| network_traffic_pattern | Outbound connections to known RMM service domains (e.g., *.screenconnect.com). |
A sign that an RMM tool has been installed and is connecting back to its control server. | Monitor DNS queries and firewall logs for connections to RMM provider domains. | high |
| log_source | Logistics Platform Audit Logs |
Changes to a shipment's destination address made by an unusual user account or at an odd time. | Implement and monitor audit logs within all freight management applications. | high |
Use application control or allowlisting to prevent the installation and execution of unauthorized software, including unapproved RMM tools.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Train employees to recognize and report phishing attempts, which are the primary initial access vector for installing the malicious RMM software.
Enforce MFA on all logistics platforms and email accounts to prevent account takeover, even if an attacker manages to steal credentials.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
To directly counter the core tactic of this cyber-enabled theft, logistics companies must implement Executable Allowlisting. This involves creating a definitive list of all software and applications that are authorized to run on company systems. Any application not on this list, including unapproved RMM tools like ScreenConnect or PDQ Connect (if not used by the company's IT department), will be blocked from executing. This can be achieved using technologies like Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC). By preventing the malicious RMM tool from ever running, the attacker's entire chain of attack is broken at the execution stage. This is far more effective than relying on antivirus, as the RMM tools themselves are legitimate software and won't be flagged as malware. This control moves the security posture from 'detecting bad' to 'only allowing good,' which is essential for preventing the abuse of legitimate tools.
Multi-factor Authentication is a critical layer of defense for the digital platforms at the heart of this threat. All user accounts on digital load boards, freight management platforms, and corporate email systems must be protected with MFA. Even if an attacker successfully phishes an employee and installs an RMM tool, MFA can prevent them from taking the next step of logging into the logistics platform with stolen or observed credentials. This creates a significant barrier to account takeover. Furthermore, business processes should be updated to require a secondary out-of-band verification (such as a phone call) for any high-risk changes, such as altering a shipment's final destination address. This combination of technical MFA controls and procedural checks makes it significantly harder for an attacker to manipulate shipment data, even if they have a presence on a company workstation.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
Help others stay informed about cybersecurity threats