A critical zero-day remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-12345, has been discovered in the NexusFlow API Gateway, a widely deployed API management solution. The vulnerability has been assigned a CVSS 10.0 score and is being actively exploited by multiple threat actors. An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this flaw by sending a specially crafted HTTP request to a vulnerable server, resulting in complete system compromise. The flaw resides in the gateway's request parsing module and is wormable, meaning compromised systems can be used to propagate the attack automatically. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has added CVE-2026-12345 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog due to the active exploitation. Voltara, the vendor, has released an emergency patch and strongly advises all users to update their systems immediately.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:HThe vulnerability exists in the request parsing module of the NexusFlow API Gateway. Specifically, the software fails to properly validate the length of a certain type of HTTP header. An attacker can send a crafted HTTP request with an overly long header value, triggering a buffer overflow. This memory corruption can be leveraged to execute arbitrary code on the underlying server with the privileges of the API gateway service, which often runs as root or SYSTEM. The attack requires no authentication and no user interaction, making it extremely dangerous and easy to automate.
The wormable nature of this exploit is a significant concern. A single compromised server can begin scanning the internet for other vulnerable NexusFlow instances, potentially leading to an exponential rate of infection similar to past security crises.
Any organization using these versions of the NexusFlow API Gateway for managing, securing, or exposing APIs is at risk. Given the product's popularity in enterprise environments, especially within the technology and financial services sectors, the potential attack surface is substantial.
CVE-2026-12345 is being actively exploited in the wild. The vulnerability was first discovered by Horizon Security Labs on January 25, 2026, during an incident response engagement. Since the public disclosure, threat intelligence firms have observed widespread scanning and exploitation attempts from various sources, including initial access brokers (IABs) and suspected nation-state actors. Due to this active exploitation, CISA has added it to the KEV catalog, requiring U.S. federal agencies to patch by February 9, 2026.
Successful exploitation of CVE-2026-12345 results in a full compromise of the API gateway server. As API gateways are critical components of modern application infrastructure, the impact is severe. Attackers can:
Security teams should hunt for indicators of compromise and exploitation attempts.
| Type | Value | Description | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
url_pattern |
Unusually long or malformed HTTP headers in requests | The core mechanism of the exploit attempt. | Web server logs, WAF logs, API gateway logs |
process_name |
Unexpected child processes of the NexusFlow service | The gateway process spawning shells (sh, bash, cmd.exe) or downloaders (curl, wget). |
EDR logs, Windows Event ID 4688, Linux auditd logs |
network_traffic_pattern |
Outbound connections from API gateway to unknown IPs | C2 communication or automated scanning for other victims. | Firewall logs, Netflow data |
log_source |
NexusFlow API Gateway application logs | Look for crash events or error messages related to request parsing. | Application-specific logs |
Protocol Metadata Anomaly Detection (D3-PMAD).5xx server errors, which could indicate a failed exploitation attempt that crashed the service. Correlate these with process monitoring logs on the server itself.Software Update (D3-SU).The most critical mitigation is to apply the security patch provided by the vendor immediately.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Use a WAF or IPS to filter for malicious request patterns as a temporary defense until patching can be completed.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Running the API gateway in a container or with reduced privileges can limit the impact of a successful RCE exploit.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
The immediate and highest priority action is to apply the emergency patch, version 3.8.1, to all instances of NexusFlow API Gateway. Due to the 'wormable' nature and active exploitation of CVE-2026-12345, this should be treated as an emergency change, bypassing standard change windows where necessary. A risk-based rollout should prioritize internet-facing gateways first, followed by internal gateways protecting critical applications. Before patching, take a snapshot or backup of the system configuration to facilitate rollback if needed. After applying the patch, verify that the service restarts correctly and that the version number is confirmed as 3.8.1 or later. Organizations must use asset inventory systems to ensure all vulnerable instances are identified and patched, as a single unpatched gateway remains a critical entry point for the entire network.
For organizations unable to patch immediately, implement inbound traffic filtering via a Web Application Firewall (WAF) or an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) as a compensating control. Configure the WAF with a virtual patch or a custom rule to inspect incoming HTTP requests for the specific malformed header that triggers CVE-2026-12345. This rule should block any request containing the anomalous header pattern before it reaches the vulnerable NexusFlow gateway. While the vendor has not published the exact pattern, security teams should work with their WAF provider to obtain an appropriate signature. This is a temporary measure and should not be considered a long-term solution, as attackers may find ways to bypass WAF rules. The ultimate goal remains to apply the vendor-supplied patch.
Assume that some systems may already be compromised. Deploy and configure an Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agent on all NexusFlow gateway servers to hunt for post-exploitation activity. Create specific detection rules to monitor the NexusFlow service process for anomalous behavior. Specifically, alert on and block any attempts by the gateway process to spawn child processes such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, /bin/bash, curl, or wget. A legitimate API gateway has no reason to spawn these interactive shells or download utilities. This EDR-based approach acts as a safety net to catch exploitation that bypasses network-level defenses and can help identify compromised hosts that require full incident response and remediation.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
Help others stay informed about cybersecurity threats