Security researchers at watchTowr Labs have publicly detailed an exploit for a critical vulnerability chain in customer-managed Progress ShareFile Storage Zones Controller (SZC). The attack combines two vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-2699, a 9.8 CVSS authentication bypass, and CVE-2026-2701, a 9.1 CVSS arbitrary file upload flaw. Chained together, they allow a remote, unauthenticated attacker to upload a web shell and achieve remote code execution (RCE), leading to a full compromise of the ShareFile server. Progress released a patch in version 5.12.4 on March 10, 2026, but the subsequent public PoC disclosure on April 2 puts tens of thousands of unpatched, internet-facing instances at immediate risk of attack. This situation is highly reminiscent of the 2023 MOVEit attacks, another Progress Software product that was mass-exploited.
The attack is a two-stage process that leverages two distinct CVEs:
Once the web shell is in place, the attacker can interact with it to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying server with the privileges of the web service account, effectively compromising the entire system.
The vulnerability chain affects the on-premise (customer-managed) Progress ShareFile Storage Zones Controller, specifically the 5.x branch.
According to internet scans, nearly 30,000 instances of ShareFile Storage Zones Controller are exposed to the internet, with the highest concentration in the United States and Germany. Any of these running a vulnerable version are at high risk.
Progress released a patch on March 10, 2026. The public disclosure of the technical details and proof-of-concept by watchTowr Labs occurred on April 2, 2026. While there was no evidence of in-the-wild exploitation before the public disclosure, the availability of a detailed write-up and PoC code makes mass scanning and exploitation highly probable. Organizations with unpatched systems should assume they are being actively targeted.
A successful exploit of this vulnerability chain leads to a full takeover of the on-premise ShareFile server. The impact is severe:
.aspx extensions or other web shell indicators..aspx, .asp, or .php files in web-accessible directories of the ShareFile application.w3wp.exe (IIS worker) process for the spawning of unusual child processes like cmd.exe or powershell.exe, which is a strong indicator of web shell execution.| Type | Value | Description |
|---|---|---|
url_pattern |
*/Config.aspx |
Access to administrative configuration pages from unauthenticated sources. |
file_name |
*.aspx |
Creation of ASPX files in web directories, indicative of a web shell. |
process_name |
w3wp.exe |
Look for this process spawning command shells. |
Detection Methods:
Response Actions:
Applying the patch from Progress is the only definitive way to remediate the vulnerability.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
Restricting access to the ShareFile server via firewall rules can serve as a temporary compensating control.
Mapped D3FEND Techniques:
The primary, and only truly effective, defense against this vulnerability chain is to update all on-premise Progress ShareFile Storage Zones Controller instances to version 5.12.4 or later. Given the public availability of a proof-of-concept exploit, this should be treated as an emergency change. Organizations must use their asset inventory and vulnerability management systems to identify all instances of ShareFile SZC, confirm their versions, and deploy the patch immediately. The history of mass exploitation of Progress Software products (e.g., MOVEit) demonstrates that threat actors will move quickly to scan for and compromise unpatched systems.
For detection and hunting, security teams must focus on analyzing the IIS web logs from their ShareFile servers. Ingest these logs into a SIEM and create rules to detect the two key stages of the attack. First, alert on any access to administrative URLs like /config.aspx from IP addresses that are not on a pre-defined allow-list of administrator IPs. This detects the authentication bypass. Second, create an alert for any HTTP POST request that results in the creation of a file with an executable web extension (e.g., .aspx, .ashx) in the ShareFile web directory. Correlating these two events from the same source IP within a short timeframe is a high-fidelity indicator of compromise.

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.
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