Executive Summary

This report analyzes a significant escalation in cyber warfare activities directed at Taiwan by state-sponsored actors from the People's Republic of China (PRC) throughout 2025. According to Taiwan's National Security Bureau (NSB), an average of 2.63 million cyberattacks targeted the island's critical infrastructure daily, representing a strategic, sustained campaign to test defenses, gather intelligence, and disrupt essential services. The attacks, attributed to known Chinese APT groups including BlackTech, Flax Typhoon, Mustang Panda, and APT41, are a key pillar of Beijing's hybrid warfare doctrine. The most heavily targeted sectors were energy, emergency services, and government agencies, indicating a clear focus on compromising national resilience. This campaign highlights the persistent and evolving threat posed by nation-state actors to critical national infrastructure (CNI).

Threat Overview

On January 4, 2026, Taiwan's NSB published its annual threat analysis, revealing the scale of China's cyber operations. The daily average of 2.63 million intrusion attempts marks a 6% year-over-year increase and a 100% increase since 2023. These attacks are not random; they are part of a coordinated effort targeting nine specific CNI sectors: energy, emergency rescue/hospitals, government, communications, transportation, finance, water resources, and technology parks. The report noted a 1,000% spike in attacks against the energy sector and a 54% rise against hospitals, demonstrating a clear intent to pressure sectors vital to public welfare and national security. The timing of attack surges often coincided with significant political events, such as the anniversary of a presidential inauguration, reinforcing the geopolitical motivations behind the campaign.

The primary attack vectors identified were:

1. Vulnerability Exploitation: Over 50% of attempts involved exploiting known and unknown flaws in hardware and software.
2. Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS): Used to disrupt the availability of public-facing services.
3. Social Engineering: Targeting personnel to gain initial access.
4. Supply Chain Attacks: Compromising trusted third-party vendors to infiltrate target networks.

Technical Analysis

The threat actors named in the report—BlackTech, Flax Typhoon, Mustang Panda, APT41, and UNC3886—are known for their sophisticated tactics. Their campaigns against Taiwan involved intensive network probing, particularly against network equipment and Industrial Control Systems (ICS). This suggests a long-term strategy of reconnaissance and prepositioning for future disruptive operations.

The following MITRE ATT&CK® techniques are consistent with the described activities:

• T1595 - Active Scanning: The intensive probing of network equipment and ICS aligns with active reconnaissance to identify vulnerabilities.
• T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application: This is the primary initial access vector, accounting for over half of all attempts.
• T1498 - Network Denial of Service: The use of DDoS attacks to disrupt services.
• T1199 - Trusted Relationship: Leveraged for supply chain attacks, compromising less secure partners to pivot into the primary target's network.
• T1078 - Valid Accounts: Often gained through social engineering or credential theft to achieve initial access and persistence.
• T1212 - Exploitation for Credential Access: Targeting network devices to extract credentials for lateral movement.
• T1485 - Data Destruction and T1486 - Data Encrypted for Impact: Consistent with the 20 identified ransomware attacks against hospitals.

Impact Assessment

The primary impact is the persistent threat to Taiwan's national security and societal stability. While the NSB did not quantify successful breaches, the sheer volume of attacks creates a constant state of alert, draining defensive resources. Successful intrusions into sectors like energy, water, and healthcare could have devastating real-world consequences, causing widespread service disruptions, economic damage, and potential loss of life. The 20 ransomware incidents against hospitals directly endangered patient care and data privacy. Furthermore, this campaign serves as a form of psychological warfare, aiming to erode public confidence in the government's ability to protect its citizens and infrastructure.

IOCs

No specific Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) were provided in the source articles.

Cyber Observables for Detection

Security teams should proactively hunt for TTPs associated with the named threat actors:

Detection & Response

• Network Traffic Analysis (D3-NTA): Implement deep packet inspection and network flow analysis, particularly on north-south traffic to CNI segments. Establish baselines for normal traffic patterns and alert on deviations, especially connections to or from unusual geolocations.
• Log Auditing: Aggressively collect and audit logs from edge devices, including firewalls, VPNs, and routers. Look for signs of exploitation attempts and successful but unauthorized logins.
• Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR): Deploy EDR solutions across all endpoints, including servers in OT environments where possible. Hunt for command-line anomalies, suspicious parent-child process relationships, and living-off-the-land techniques.
• Deception Technology (D3-DE): Deploy decoys and honeypots within critical network segments to detect and analyze attacker TTPs in a controlled environment.

Mitigation

• Patch Management (M1051 - Update Software): Prioritize patching of internet-facing systems, network devices, and software identified as targets by the named APT groups. Implement a risk-based patching program to address critical vulnerabilities immediately.
• Network Segmentation (M1030 - Network Segmentation): Enforce strict network segmentation between IT and OT environments. Use firewalls and access control lists to restrict communication, preventing attackers from moving laterally from a compromised IT system to critical ICS/SCADA systems.
• Multi-Factor Authentication (M1032 - Multi-factor Authentication): Mandate MFA for all remote access, privileged accounts, and access to sensitive systems. This is a critical defense against credential theft and reuse.
• User Training (M1017 - User Training): Conduct regular security awareness training focused on identifying phishing, social engineering, and other common initial access techniques.