Automated Attacks Wipe Exposed MongoDB Databases, Demanding $500 Ransom

Ongoing Extortion Campaign Targets Thousands of Misconfigured MongoDB Servers

MEDIUM
February 1, 2026
5m read
CyberattackData BreachCloud Security

Impact Scope

People Affected

Owners of at least 1,400 servers

Industries Affected

TechnologyOther

Related Entities

Products & Tech

MongoDB Bitcoin

Other

Flare

Full Report

Executive Summary

Cybersecurity firm Flare has uncovered an ongoing, automated extortion campaign targeting publicly exposed MongoDB databases. The attack involves a threat actor scanning the internet for MongoDB instances that lack basic authentication controls. Upon finding an open server, the attacker's script automatically wipes all data and leaves behind a ransom note demanding a payment of approximately $500 in Bitcoin. Flare's research found that of 3,100 completely unsecured MongoDB servers discovered, nearly 46% (around 1,400) had already been compromised by this campaign. These attacks, while less common than several years ago, serve as a critical reminder of the importance of fundamental database security hygiene.


Threat Overview

This is a low-sophistication, high-volume automated attack. The threat actor is not using zero-day exploits or advanced techniques but is simply capitalizing on a common and well-known misconfiguration: running a database in production with no authentication required for access.

Attack Flow:

  1. Scanning: The attacker uses automated tools like Shodan or custom scripts to scan the internet for open MongoDB ports (typically port 27017).
  2. Connection: The script attempts to connect to discovered servers without any credentials.
  3. Data Wipe: If the connection is successful (i.e., no authentication is required), the script programmatically deletes all databases and collections on the server.
  4. Ransom Note: The script then creates a new database or collection with a ransom note. The note typically contains instructions for payment, a Bitcoin address, and a threat that the data will be lost forever if the ransom is not paid. In reality, the attacker likely does not back up the data; the 'wipe' is a destructive act.

Critical Insight: Attackers in these campaigns rarely, if ever, return the data. The data is typically destroyed, not exfiltrated and stored. Paying the ransom is highly unlikely to result in data recovery.

Technical Analysis

The attack relies on the default configuration of some older versions of MongoDB or on administrator error. In the past, MongoDB instances would bind to 0.0.0.0 by default and not enforce authentication, making them publicly accessible. While modern versions have improved default security, many legacy systems or misconfigured new deployments remain vulnerable.

MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

Impact Assessment

  • Permanent Data Loss: For organizations without proper backups, this attack results in permanent and catastrophic data loss.
  • Operational Disruption: The loss of a production database can bring business operations to a complete halt, leading to significant financial and reputational damage.
  • Low Cost, High Reward for Attacker: The automated nature of the attack means the threat actor can target thousands of victims with minimal effort. Even if only a small fraction pay the $500 ransom, the campaign can be highly profitable.

Cyber Observables for Detection

Type Value Description Context Confidence
port 27017 The default port for MongoDB. Monitor for unexpected inbound connections from the internet. Firewall logs, network flow data high
log_source mongod.log The MongoDB log file. Look for a high volume of connection and command activity from an unknown IP, followed by dropDatabase commands. Database server logs high
other Ransom note in database The presence of a new database or collection with a name like README, RECOVER_YOUR_DATA, or similar, containing a ransom message. Database monitoring high

Detection & Response

  • Detect: Regularly use attack surface management (ASM) tools or services like Shodan to scan your own public IP space for exposed database ports. Configure database auditing to log administrative commands like dropDatabase and alert on them. Monitor firewall logs for inbound connections to port 27017 from untrusted sources.
  • Response: If a database is wiped, immediately isolate the server from the network to preserve any forensic evidence. Do NOT pay the ransom. Begin restoration procedures from your most recent known-good backup. Conduct a post-mortem to identify and remediate the configuration error that allowed the breach.

Mitigation

Preventing these attacks involves basic security best practices for database administration.

  1. Enforce Authentication: This is the most critical step. Ensure your MongoDB instances have authentication enabled and require all clients to provide valid credentials. (M1032 - Multi-factor Authentication and M1027 - Password Policies)
  2. Network Hardening: Configure your MongoDB server to only listen for connections on a trusted interface (e.g., bind to a private IP address, 127.0.0.1 if local access only). Never expose a database directly to the public internet. Use firewall rules to restrict access to the database port to only specific, trusted application servers. (M1035 - Limit Access to Resource Over Network)
  3. Principle of Least Privilege: Create specific user roles with the minimum permissions necessary for the application to function. The application's service account should not have permissions to drop databases. (M1026 - Privileged Account Management)
  4. Data Backup: Maintain regular, tested backups of your databases. Store backups in a separate, isolated location. (M0930 - Data Backup)

Timeline of Events

1
February 1, 2026
This article was published

MITRE ATT&CK Mitigations

Do not expose databases directly to the internet. Restrict network access to only trusted application servers.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Enforce strong authentication on all database instances.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Apply the principle of least privilege. Application accounts should not have administrative rights like 'dropDatabase'.

Mapped D3FEND Techniques:

Regularly back up and test the restoration of critical data to ensure recovery from a destructive attack.

Sources & References

Article Author

Jason Gomes

Jason Gomes

• Cybersecurity Practitioner

Cybersecurity professional with over 10 years of specialized experience in security operations, threat intelligence, incident response, and security automation. Expertise spans SOAR/XSOAR orchestration, threat intelligence platforms, SIEM/UEBA analytics, and building cyber fusion centers. Background includes technical enablement, solution architecture for enterprise and government clients, and implementing security automation workflows across IR, TIP, and SOC use cases.

Threat Intelligence & AnalysisSecurity Orchestration (SOAR/XSOAR)Incident Response & Digital ForensicsSecurity Operations Center (SOC)SIEM & Security AnalyticsCyber Fusion & Threat SharingSecurity Automation & IntegrationManaged Detection & Response (MDR)

Tags

MongoDBData BreachExtortionMisconfigurationDatabase Security

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